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Woman Centered: 
A Feminist Ethic of Responsibility 
Rebecca Whisnant 
In recent years, feminist philosophers have emphasized that, in a society or-
ganized on principles of dominance and subordination, much militates 
aga inst the development of responsible moral agency. Such agency is some-
thing that many of us have to struggle toward , hoping through conscious ef-
fOlt to grow into the kinds of selves we need to be to free ourselves and oth-
ers from oppression. 
For those less fortunately locatecl within various matrices of domination, 
the challenges of responsible moral agency are many. Oppression is inter-
nalized in more ways than one: not only does it often lead its victims to think 
ill of themselves, it can also lead them simply not to think of themselves 
much at all. Women, for instance, are taught in myriad ways-from being 
erased in the media to bing ignored and inte rrupted in conversa tion- that 
we are simply not veIY interesting or important. What we do, thinl<' and feel 
thus comes to seem not wOlthy even of our own attention, let alone anyone 
else's. (The slogan for Women's E-News, a feminist news website: "What 
news 10 ks like when women matte!'. ") Our lives seem to lack the kind of 
drama that make them compelling in our own eyes- not because of their 
substance, but simply because of whose lives they are. 
Feminists have been especially concerned, of course, with the particular 
personal and moral perils that may be associated with the sociopolitica l sit-
uation(s) of women. In particular, as many have observed, the cultural as-
Signment of women to various forms of "caring labor" can be harmful to 
women, both individually and collectively, by rendering them dangerously 
vulnerable to exploitation. Women who fa il to rein in th_eir "carin " for tb.: 
ers may maintain relationships at all costs (including to themselves), avoid 
legitimate self-assertion in order to keep the peace, devote their energies to 
---
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others &the expense of s If-development, and protect ey n those others 
whose be aviOr is abusiv or exploitative. J 
In short, there are significant moral and-personal dangers associated with 
excessive or deformed practices of care for others, especially when these are 
combined with inadequate regard for oneself. Attention to these dangers 
may lead us to question whether-as is commonly assumed- the path to 
fu lly responsible moral agency, and out of oppression, always involves m~re 
caring attention to others and less to oneself. The emphasis of the philo-
sophical tradition on avoiding selfishness may gain its surface plausibility, at 
least in patt, from a pervasive male bias . 
In this chapter, I build on these and other insights of feminist philosophy 
in an attempt to describe and recommend a celtain state of character--one 
that I see as personally vital, morally important, and enormously difficult and 
vexing for many women. 
Imagine a person who identifies deeply with particular other people-
investing herself in their well-being, passionately empathizing with their 
points of view, contributing routinely to their projects, and so on. While such 
deep caring and identification is one of life's great goods, and we might well 
w !come such a person as a friend or lover, we can also recognize her as po-
tentially at risk of "losing herself. " Although "losing oneself' in and through 
others is not in itself gender-speCific, it is endemic to traditional feminine 
roles. Many women are trained in implicit and explicit ways to id ntify 
nearly completely with their role as helpers and caretakers of those close to 
them- partner , children, friends, aging parents, and the like-and to put 
first the duties that accompany these roles, to the detriment of their own in-
d ividual n eds and proje ts 2 
To av id los ing oneself, or to find oneself once lost, it is not enough to pay 
attention to oneself as simply "one among others." Rather, what is needed is 
to c nter ones If. elf-centering involves a kind of primaIY attention to one's 
own projects and perspectives that protects one from dissolution or sub-
sumption and that differs both from objectionable forms of self-privileging 
and from "partiality" as commonly construed. To fail to center oneself is to 
fail to be as one ought in an important way: namely, it impairs one's capac-
ity to function as a fully responsible moral agent. In what follows, I fill out 
the structure of self-centering and outline its personal and moral importance. 
RISKS TO SELF: DISSOLUTION 
Marga ret Urban Walker proposes what she calls a responsibility ethics, em-
phasizing that "specific moral claims on us arise from our contact or rela-
tionship with others whose interests are vu lnerable to our ac nd 
choices. We are obfigated to respond to particufif othe rsw!'iei'iC11'Ct1m-
- - -
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stance or ongo' l ' h' . , 
, mg re allons Ip render them espeCIally consp Jcuo usly, or 
peculIarly depend " ( , " 
th ' . em on us 1998, 107). A w ell-functlOnmg moral agent on IS vIew then uld be . ' , h . ' , wo one who re ponds appropnately to and wIthin 
er \'an?us relationships: a respon ibiliey ethi is an ethic of appropriace 
responSIveness, 
Evaluating modes and levels of responsiveness is a complex matter, In hi-
erarchica l relat ' h ' " , ' f 1 t Ions IpS, m partIcular the partIes' conceptIOns 0 W lat coun s 
as appropriat " 'I 
, r Spon Iyen ss may w lJ be profoundly skewed . T 1e pot n-
tlal problems ~ I ' I 
b 1, or SUC 1 an ethiC, howey r are not limited to those introduce y 11erarchy As W: lk ·' ' .. , 
ethic of "0 '_ a ~I pomt~ out, some cntlCS haye worned ~at such an 
h 
pen ended lesponslVeness" IS mll111ca! to IOtegnty, WIth so many 
ot ers to wh ' 
, om one mu t stand ready to respond, and so many ways 111 
which one m' h ' " f ' "? 19 t respond to them how can one's life remam 0 a piece , 
Walker ob l ' , 's serves t lat, of the several kinds of "narratives" that constitute one 
self-u~derstanding, the "narrative of relationship" seems most liable to un-
denUl' , d f' 
ne mtegnty , for in that narrative, "it seems that one is pressed to e me 
how she goes on in terms de rived from others' needs and demands, and oth-
ers' unpredictable situations" 0998, 111). The risk of so doing, however, is a 
, Sort oUUte.rlessness_an unlimite I and indiscriminate receptivity, A person 
who lives by an ethic of open-ended responsiveness, it seems, is vulnerable 
toak d ' m of d issolution, 
. The answer to this problem, in Walk r's view, lies in the fact that the nar-
rative of relationship is not the only (or perhaps even th central) narratIve 
through w hich one gUides and makes sense of one's life, Equally important, 
she argues, a re narrative of ide ntity aDd of value, In fact, none of us is tr~lly 
fllterless: each person has a "p rsistent history of va luation" through which 
s,he selects some people, situations, and r latio nships fo r he r ~rima ry, a ~~en~ 
tlon, Whether conSCiously or not Walker says, we "set d fmlt pnolll1e~ 
among values devel p highly se l~ctive responses, and pay acute attention 
t ' ' ) TI' d .'1 es at 
o particular kinds of things as well as people" ?998, 1?2 ' , 1:'~, ~CII .} 1 
least part of what Walker means by a "narrative of IdentLty , It , IS lalg y 
through this elective attention that one ca rves out, and distingLllshes from 
one's surroundings, the palticular person that one means to be, Thus, not 
only is such sel ctiv attention permissibl , on Walker's view, it is morally 
necessa ly, for it "refl ect[s] and refiners] a moral identity that gives our delib-
erations greater focus and refinement, Equally important, [it let 1 othe rs 
know w here we stancl and what we stand for" (112). 
So through the selective attention that stL'uctures one's responsiveness, 
one becomes (as Bernard Williams might say) "someone in particular, "3 As 
Walker puts it, 
It's the coherence of the three narratives, and connections among them, that 
makes a distinctive moral li fe out of what could otherwise be an odd lot of 
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disparate parts .. . . A li fe's being so organized ... enables the person living 
that life to decide with good reason how and wha t to select, within the limits 
of moral acceptabili ty, fo r some (or most) attention. At the same time, a life 
legible in these ways gives promise to others of reliable performance and ac-
countability of specific kinds. 0998, 114-115) 
Sele tive attention, then, is important to having an identity; without it, one 
would be unmanageably permeable and indiscriminately responsive. To the 
extent that such a person can be imagin d, h or she would lack anything 
that we might ca ll a personal identity or character. Such a life, as Walker says, 
seems "unown d even if benign." 
What Wa lker wants to show, in add itio n, is that o ne who lacks such an 
identi ty is unlike ly to functio n well as a moral agent amo ng others-that i 
to say, that he or she is likely not to be entirely benign. Selectiy.e...attention, 
Walker thinks, is necessalY for integrity, an d integrity is "interpersonally as 
well as intrapersonally indisp nsable." Rejecting any view of integri ty as in-
tactness or purity, she defines it instead as "a kind of re liable accountability," 
recommending that we "(t]hink of 'integri ty' used to describe the sturdiness 
of structures p op le have built, the property of holding up dependably un-
der th weights and stresses these structure a re apt to encounter given the 
purposes to which they are put and the conditions they might encounter" 
(1998, 115). A person is less likely to display integrity so understood if she 
is-or even tries to be-uniformly attentive and responsive. She is so "de-
centered" that she cannot be located , let a lone be "read" by others for her 
particular strengths, vuln rabilities, and patterns of dependable response.4 
We might say, following Walker's metaphor, that she lacks any "structure" at 
all, let alone a sturdy or dependable one. 
The novelist George Eliot aptly d s rib d the verpowering flood of sen-
sation that such a lack of tructure would permit, observing in Middlemarch 
that "if we had a keen vision and feeling of all of ordinary buman life, it 
would be like bearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we 
should die of that roar which lies n the other side of silence. As it is, the 
quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity."s Grass and squirrels 
aside, the point is tbat persons can contain and tolerate only so much em-
pathy, even for other persons. In order for one's "vision and feeling" to func-
tion as part of an integrated personali ty, one needs to "filter out" not only the 
squirrel's heartbeat, but also some of the human feelings and needs that 
might othelw ise call for one's empathic response. To put it metaphorically, 
then, one ca nnot simply blend or dissolve into one's surroundings and still 
maintain a personal character-to so dissolve is to lose oneself. To the ex-
tent that perspectival "filte ring" is necessary, it must be governed by some 
particular and limited set of values and priorities (whether or not these are 
consciously and explicitly endorsed). Such filtering (or "stupidity" as Eliot 
calls it) allows one to remain lodged in a palticular experience and point of 
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view-a . kind of emotional and perspectiva l "home base ." To lack sllch a 
perspectival home is to risk a dangero us cente rlessness. 
RISKS TO SELF: "VICARIOUS POSSESSION" 
But to avoid 10 ing o n self, is it nOLlgh merely to have some pe rspectival fil -
ter 0 1' atl :) W' . I lei: III Just any filter lo? To see that it w Ul not, imagine that y LI 
laVe a palt1cular kind of filt 1': o ne that focu es your attention intensely and 
rOlltinely n tl' .' '. . 
, ,e expe l le n es, f'ee lll'lgs, and need of a pam ular othe r p r-
son. Whal y u a l' mo ·t d d . . . . . . 
I . ' s attune an responsive to II'l any given Situation IS lOW It affe t l' . . 
. . . c S t 11S other person ; he r experience (as you empathlcally lmag-
me It) IS alive to you and salie nt to you in a way that no one else's is-not 
even you r own. 
What shall we say about this case? It seems wrong to say that you lack a 
personal character; afte r all, you do have a "persistent history of va luation"-
thus, you are like ly to be p rfe tly "legible" to others, who will know what 
r spo n es and pattern of atte ntion to expect from you in most situations. Al-
though you have a perspectival center, that center is not located in you. Un-
like that of the decentered person, your life is not "unowned"- it is owned , 
but we wonder by w hom. The risk to your id ntity here is not dissolution, 
but sub umption. 
The kind of pe rspectival filte r I have in mind is well illustrated by Simone 
de Beauvoir's po rtra it, in The Second Sex, of "The Woman in Love." Beauvoir 
says the fOllOWing about the woman lover's re lationship to her (male) 
beloved: 
The m asure of value the truth of the world are in his consciousness; hence it 
i not enough 10 serv~ him. The woman in I~ve tries to see with his eyes; she 
reads the books he reads, prefers the pictures and die music he prefers; she is 
II1tereSled only in the landscape she see with him .. . when she questions her-
self, it is his reply she tries to hea r .... Her idea of I cation in space, even, is up-
set: the center of the world is no longer die place where sbe is, but that occu-
pied I y her lover .... She lets her own world collapse in contingence, for he 
rea lly lives in his. (1983, 663) 
It would be misguided, of course, to suggest that all "women in love" (or, for 
that matter, no men in lov ) adopt this sort of perspective . Furthermore, lo ve 
IS not the only attitude or siluation that can give rise to such a radica lly re-
ordered perspective 6 Nonetheless, Beauvoir's description captures a phe-
nom non that is both familiar and important: the focus of the "woman in 
love" is wholly on what's good/or another person, and/or on w hat is good 
j 1'Om his or her point of view. Either she has no independe nt conception of 
w hat i good (in genera l, o r for herselO, or to the extent that sh does have 
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such a conception, she cannot bring herself to care about it, to be moved by 
it, or to direct her attention to it in any velY sustained or engaged way. There 
is indeed a perspectival filter here, and w hat is "fil tered out" is her own self-
her perspectives, feelings, and interests--or at least these as her own, in par-
ticular as independent of anyone else's. 
Adrian Piper (1991) describes a similar condition , but offers greater detail. 
Piper contends that "modal imagination"-the capacity to imagine how 
things could be-is crucial to moral agency. She draws a distinction among 
imaginative objects "according to the degree of one's momentalY experien-
tial involvement in them. Some such objects hold us in their grip, while oth-
ers slide over the surface of our awareness while barely disrupting our emo-
tional and psychological state at all" (733). Piper calls the latter a "sU/jace 
object of imagination." In contrast, she says, "dep th obj ects of imagination call 
forth a deeper psychological investment of energy and attention. They oc-
cupy a larger proportion of one's waking consciousness, and may either re-
place or vividly enhance reality as one experiences it. . . . Most imaginative 
objects lie somewhere between the two" (733). 
The distinction Piper describes is experientially familiar, but philosophi-
cally underremarked. When it is remarked , it is often in order to emphasize 
the moral importance of encountering others' feelings and needs as depth 
objects of imagination--of entering empathically into another's experience 
and perspective. The incapacity or unwillingness to so enter is a moral 
vice-as Piper calls it, the vice of self-absorption. The self-absorbed person 
is too caught up in her Own point of view to imagine how things appear and 
feel to the other person. In Piper's terms, she experiences her own inner 
states as "depth objects" of imagination , and the other person 's inner states 
as mere "surface objects"-while she may be dimly aware of the latter, they 
simply don 't make much of an impact. 
For many people who lean toward self-absorption , moral growth centrally 
involves learning to allow others into one's own inner world and to admit 
others' feelings and needs as real. Piper points out, however, that as wid1 
many vices (all, if we believe Aristode) there is a contralY vice that results 
from "too much" rather than "too little" of the relevant action or feeling. 
Piper's term for the vice contrary to self-absorption is "vicarious possession." 
As one might expect, it involves treating one's own inner states as surface 
objects, and the other's inner states as depth objects of imagination. Piper de-
scribes vicarious possession as follows: 
1. one empathically experiences the odler's feelings as one imagines dlem to the 
exclusion of one's Own reactions to iliem (i.e., a case of being "out of touch with 
one's feelings"); 2. one is so preoccupied with imagining what the odler is iliink-
ing that one's own dloughts are temporarily suppressed; and 3. one's actions re-
flect one's conception of the other's wishes or deSires as to how one should act 
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or what should be cl I I " 
, . one. n genera, to be vlcanously possessed by another per-
son s lOner states h ' . '. 
means t at one sown sentlence, ratlonahty and agency are 
suppre I ' f ' 
. ssee m avor of the other's as one empad1ically imagines her to be. This 
Constitutes an abc!!:.cation of one's self to anotber as one imagines her. 0991, 
740--741; mphasis;aa;efcldJ;;e;ddR"") "'------:~..:...:...~=~~ 
:oting the existence of vicarious possession-and of people who lean to-
a.ld It, rather than toward self-absorption- is an important step. As Piper 
f omts out, many accounts of moral impartiality (both for and against) "are 
aulty in presupposing the natural preeminence in consciousness of one's 
OWn inner states over another's as one empathically imagines them. [They 
atsumel . . . that impaltialiry consists in applying a corrective to a natural ten-
e ency to self-absorption alone-as though vicarious possession were not as ~uCh of a vice, and as prevalent a vice, at the opposite extreme" 0991, 750) . 
would only reiterate that this pelvasive assumption is a prime example of 
a male gender bias in mainstream moral philosophy. 
A DIFFERENT IDEAL: SELF-CENTERING 
While it is easy enough to see the person in the grip of vicarious possession 
as In some way lacking, it is more difficult to say just what it is that she lacks 
and. why it matters. To begin with, it seems, such a pe rson's pattern of at-
tention are out of kilter. Robin S. Dillon (1992) points out the close concep-
tual Connection between attention and respect. In particular, she obselves 
that the root meaning of "respect" is tile Latin "respicere," which means "to ~,oOk back at" or "to look at again" (70). "This suggests," Dillon continues, 
both that we re/spect things that are worm looking at again, and that in re-
sp.ecting something we pay careful attention to it" (70). Respecting some-
thIng reqUires that we pay attention to it long enough to see it for what it re-
ally is, and moreover that our attention to it reveal what is valuable about it. 
This understanding, in turn, helps reveal what counts as a respectful behav-
Ioral response to the thing, "[WJhat counts as respecting me object, acting re-
spectfully, or re ponding appropriately out of respect is determined by the 
nature of the object and its respect-warranting fact or feature" (71). 
Absent vicarious possession, then, a person pays attention to her own in-
ner states-to her childhood memories, to her late t professional project, or 
to her plans for the afternoon or her vision of world peace. Her self-valUing, 
'1 however, is more emotionally resonant than this description might suggest. 
I Such a erson takes jo in what eases her, actively pursues what interests 
" her, and is accor ingly reluctant to abandon herself to take up imagined res-
idence in the psyches of others. Her respectful attention is likely to have an 
additional result: namely, mat its obj cts come alive to her. As Marilyn Ftye 
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puts it, "attention is a kind of passion. When one's attention is on omething, 
one is present in a particular way wid1 resp ct to d1at thing . .. . The orienta-
tion of one's attention is also what fixes and directs the application of one's 
physical and emotional work" (1983, 172). Thus, the more one's careful at-
tention is devoted to one's own plans, projects, and values, d1e more likely 
one is to turn one's time and efforts toward furd1ering and enacting them. 
But there is a deeper structure here, for underlying all d1ese objects of her 
self-reflexive attention is her own status as a rational creature wid1 an active 
valuational capacity. In deeming iliese objects worthy of her attention, she 
implicitly acknowledges and honors that status-or, better, that capacity itself. 
Harry Frankfurt makes a similar point in his recent discussion of self-love: 
As with every variety of love, the hean of [self-lovel is that the lover cares about 
the well-being of his beloved for its own sake ... . Since in this case the beloved 
is himself, the interests to which he is devoted by his self-love are his own. Now 
those inte rests, like the true interests of anyone, are defined and determined by 
what he loves. Thus . . . [al person who loves himself displays and demonstrates 
that love just by being devoted to what he loves. (2001, 8) 
To put the point more generally: one enacts and expresses one's attitude to-
ward oneself as a valuer through one's attitude toward what one values. 
So far, much the same account seems to hold whether the object of a per-
son 's attention and devotion is her own inner states o r someone else's. In 
paying attention to these inner states, one acknowledges and honors the 
valuational capacity that generates them, whether or not that capacity is 
one 's own. But there is something distinctive about this relationship be-
tween valuing a person and valuing w hat she values, w hen the object of 
valuation is oneself. 
We can see the first distinctive e lement of self-valuing by introducing an 
objection to Frankfurt'S account. Frankfurt himself believes d1at d1e structure 
of self-love described earlie r is identical to iliat of love for another, and in-
deed he claims this apparent parallel as a point in favor of his account of self-
love. In fact, however, it is commonplace to love someone else while not 
loving, or even being particularly interested in, at least some things that they 
love. For instanc , I love my mother, and she loves gardening. I care about 
her doing d1e iliings she loves (including gardening), and her loves are part 
of what I love about her. Noneilieless, I have no interest in gardening in and 
of itself. If my mother's gardening required my help in any way I would be 
glad to provide it, but since it doesn't, I don't. Thus, it seems a stretch to say 
that in order to love my moilier, I must be "devoted" to what she loves 7 
In contrast, it seems entirely correct to say iliat in order to love myself-or 
even, to put it in my terms, to value and respect myself properJy- I must be 
devoted to what I love. In short, I have to l-ealty love what I love. Frankfurt 
puts it tl1is way: 
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The hea lth of the mind lies . .. In being wholehearted. A wholehearted person 
. Identifies himself fully and uninhibitedly with the volitional configurations 
that defme his final ends. Thi wholehealted identification means that there is 
no ambiva lence in his attitude towards himself. There is no part of him-no part 
With WlllCh he identifies-that is opposed to or that resists his loving what he 
loves. He is altogether wholehearted in loving what he loves. In other words he 
10 I· . ' ves 1lmself. HIS self- love is constituted by the wholeheartedness of his unified 
will. (2001, 12) 
Here, Frankfurt points out two elements that seem to me distinctive of how 
one must approach one's own loves (or "volitional configurations") in order 
to be properly self-valuing: one must endorse them and one must identify 
oneself With them.s Neither is necessarily involved in loving others. Although 
We do care deeply about our loved ones' ends, it is less common to regard 
those ends as embodying or expressing oneself. In contrast, a self-loving 
person quite literally identifies with his own ends. Encountering his willings 
~nd loves, he says "this is me." Thus, his approach to his own ends is, as 
rankfurt says, w holehearted. 
Thus, a person w ho properly values herself cannot encounter herself as 
~erely "one among others." Rather, she occupies the center of her own emo-
tional and perspectival field; her stance is what I'll call (with intentional 
Irony) "self-centered." In his argument for the compatibility of love with the 
egalitarian spirit of morality, ]. David Velleman (1999) ably shows that it is 
P~ssible to value some persons in a special or distinctive manner without at-
tnbuting any greater value to them. By placing my account of self-centering 
Within Velleman's framework , I hope to show that self-centering as I under-
stand it has nothing to do with crass egoism or self-privileging. The distinc-
tion between egoism and self-centering, besides being important in its own 
nght, is especially vital for many women, whose feminine SOCialization may 
render them particularly vulnerable to accusations of "selfishness." 
According to VeUeman, love is (contra Sigmund Freud) not a drive or "in-
ner itch. " In fact, it is not any kind of desire to achieve a result; contralY to 
much analytic philosophy on the subject, love is not a desire at all, altho Igh 
it is frequently associated with various desires (e.g., to be w ith the beloved, 
to please he r, to benefit her, and/or to be well thought of by her). Freud and 
the analytic philosophers have shared a common error in assuming that love 
can be analyzed in terms of an aim. This assumption, Velleman observes, 
"implies that love is essentially a pro-attitude toward a result, to which the 
beloved is instrumental or in which he is involved. I venture to suggest that 
love is essentially an attitude toward the beloved himself but not toward any 
r~_aLalI" (19 , 5Zt):-To explain how this is possible, he appeals to Im-
manuel Kant's idea that the end of an action can be a person rather than a 
result. In respecting a person as an end in herself, we do not try to bring 
about some particular result; instead, we recognize the value of the person 
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and allow that value to constrain ~aeti~d.-ber. Similarly, love is a 
respOnse to the already-existing reality of the person, in particular to the 
value of her rational nature or "true self." A person's rational nature is not 
merely her intellect, but something broader: her "capacity to care about 
things in that reflective way which is distinctive of self-conscious creatures 
like us. Think of a person 's rational nature as his core of reflective concern, 
and the idea of loving him for it will no longer seem odd" (365-366)9 
Velleman summarizes as follows his view of the relation between respect 
and love: "The Kantian view is that respect is a mode of valuation that the 
very capacity for valuation must pay to instances of itself. My view is that 
love is a mode of valuation that this capacity may also pay to instances of it-
self. I regard respect and love as the requir d minimum and optional maxi-
mum responses to one and th sam value" 0999, 366). Like respect, love is 
a response to the value of this rational nature or true self; and again, like re-
spect, love is less like a desire or urge than like a kind of awe or wonder. In 
respect or reverence, one's recognition of this value arrests one's impulse 
toward (what Ka nt calls) "self-love" and thus gets in the way of one's using 
the other as a mere means to one's aims. Love, according to Velleman, goes 
a step further: when one loves the other, one appreciates her value as a ra-
tional bing in a special way-a way that arrests one's emotional defense , 
thus making oneself vulnerable to her. 10 One who loves is willing to be laid 
bare to the other and to be deeply affected by her. 
Presumably, then, loving oneself would involve appreciating the value of 
one's own rational nature-where this appreciation arrests one's emotional 
defenses toward oneself, allows one to be deeply affected by oneself, and 
unleashes various emotional r sponses t ward oneself. This sounds a bit 
strange: for instance, what could it mean not to be deeply affected by on -
self? Self-love so understood sounds very much like what I am calling self-
centering, while in contrast, one in the grip of vicarious possession is likely 
to be inured to her own feelings, uninterested in her own distinct perspec-
tive, and largely unmoved by her own preferences and projects. And as I've 
argued, such a person fails to respond appropriately to the value of her own 
valuational capacity-she feels and acts as if her own valuational capacity 
had no real power to confer value. 
To encounter robustly, from the inside, the value of one's own rational na-
ture does not necessarily involve wanting to benefit oneself or promote 
one's own welfare . For as Velleman observes, love is not the same as-and 
is not even nec ssarily accompanied by-the desire to benefit the beloved: 
Cel1ainly, lov for my children leads me to promote their interests almost da ily; 
yet when I think of other people I love-parents, brothers, friends, former 
teachers and students-I do not think of myself as an agent of the ir interest. I 
would of course do th m a favor if a ked, but in the absence of some such oc-
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casion for benefiting them, I have no continuing or recurring desire to do so. At 
the thought of a close friend, my heart doesn't fi ll with an urge to do something 
for him, although it may indeed fill with love. 0999, 353) 
The point is important, for it shows that a special response to one's own 
value n eed not amount to the kind of partiality in which one privileges one's 
Own lOterests over o thers, or even regards oneself primarily as an agent of 
One's own interestsll Centering oneself does not mean putting extra weight 
On one's own interests or concerns simply because they are one's own: in-
deed, the weighing metaphor already assumes that one is relating to one's 
~oncerns as objects among others. A self-centered person instead occupies 
er OWn perspective as its subject, a natural result of which is that her own 
~0~1cerns seem weighty to her-that they actually affect her and engage her. 
his In turn does not necessarily mean that she w ill then seek to benefit her-
self above others-just lil<e (as Velie man points out) loving someone else 
does not necessarily mean one seeks to benefit them (at all, let alone above 
Others). Whether she prioritizes her own well-being will depend on (among 
other things) the content of her own concerns, which might well be altruis-
ttc. G.:r J 6' In( "'\Iv 4- e fl' ·e" I ,~ 1- H../ r ;; C 
In this section , I've argued that when one turns one 's engaged and re- / 
spectful attention on oneself the attention is expressed and manifested in 
unique ways due to facts inel~lctably associated with one's being oneself. Al-r. 
though the nature and quality of such attention is the same regardless of to 
Whom it is directed, its dynamiCS shift when its object as well as its subject is 
Oneself. The result is the condition that I caU "self-centering. " 
SELF-CONSTRUCTION AND RESPONSIBLE AGENCY 
According to Piper vicarious possession is not only a potentially perilous 
condition , but a m~ra l fa iling as well. She argues that vicarious possession is 
a Vice for the very same reason that self-absorption is a vice: namely, each vi-
olates th moral r qu ir ment of "strict impaltiality. "12 For example, she says, 
one may regard another'S pain as one empathically imagines it as more worthy 
of consideration than one's own as one directly experiences it, because one re-
ga rds other p ople in general as more wOliliy man oneself; or because one re-
gards other people's inner states as inll'insically more interesting or worthy of 
IIlVestigation than one's own .... [Tlhe irrelevant attribute that directs one's per-
SOnal bias to tile other is the attribute of being other than oneself. (1991, 752) 
So in Piper's view, vicarious possession funs afoul of moral impartiality in 
that it de-emphasizes one's own experience (or "inner states") for no good 
reason , thus implicitly devaluing oneself in comparison to otl1ers. Vicarious 
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possession is wrong for the same reason that it would be wrong to judge one 
person's pain less impOltant than another's because of their relative heights 
(an irrelevant attribute). 
I've suggested , however, d1at "which person I am" in any given encounter 
is not irrelevant in the way that someone's height is irrelevant to how much 
his o r her pain matters. Thus, I am not convinced that impartiality as Piper 
understands it is d1e proper antidote to vicarious possession. I offer a differ-
ent view of what is morally wrong with vicarious possession, and more 
broadly, with the failure to center oneself. Self-centering is not only a war-
ranted response to the va lue of one' own rational agency (as Kant would 
call it), it is also crucial to constructing and maintaining oneself as a distinct 
person, and thus also to one's functioning as a fully responsible moral agent. 
In order to preserve one's r sponsible agency, one must self-center- that is, 
one must fu lly inhabit one's own perspective as its subject, rather than en-
countering it as an object among others. 
When we ask w hat makes someone a distinct person, the most obvious 
place to look for an answer is from theorists of personal identity , whose busi-
ness it is to say when, where , and in virtue of what one person leaves off and 
another begins. The strand of personal identity theOlY beginning with Derek 
Parfit ( 984) has some affinity with what I have been arguing thus far, in that 
it ties the notion of distinct personhood-or being a distinct self- to norma-
tive considerations1 3 Parfitian psychological connection theOlY thus changes 
the way of addressing the nature of personhood in an important respect: it 
ties survival up definitionally with "what matters." "Instead of asking whether 
I shall be some future person," Parfit says, "I ask w hether my relation to this 
person contains what matters" 0 984, 271) . 
Some have criticiz d psychological connection theory on the grounds mat 
it cannot explain or justify the special concern that (it's assumed) we each 
have for our own future selves1 4 If that future self is not me-that is, nu-
merically identical with me-then what explains or justifies my having spe-
cial concern for her of th SOlt one normally has for oneself? Or, to put it a 
different way, what is the diff' rence between th is future self and all d1e other 
ones, given that none of d10se future selves is identical with me?15 The prob-
lem seems exacerbated by taking seriously Pat-fit's view that not only are 
none of those future selves identical with me, but in fact my relation to the 
future self that is me is not fundamentally different from my relation to those 
that are not. If this is so , then it is not even quite clear what it means to say 
that one of the future selves is me, let alone why I would or should have spe-
cial concern for that one . 
Jennifer Whiting (986), a psychological connection theorist, l' jects the 
notion that special concern is justified only by numerical identity, pointing 
out the obvious but underappreciated fact that we have a special concern for 
certain other persons as well as for ourselves. She explains and justifies spe-
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cial concern for one's own future self by comparing it to the concern one has 
for one's friends . 
. Suppose, then, that I am asked what justifies my concern for a particular 
fflend. I respond that the friend shares many of my values, desires, and in-
terests, that I have shared many experiences with her, and that she influences 
my choices and va lues, as I do hers. As these hared values, experiences, and 
Interests unfolded over time, I developed care and concern for her-first 
primitive concerns that she do or experience celtain particular things (e.g., 
that she do well on her exam or that she have a successful shopping trip), 
and then a general concern for her welfare. This is roughly Whiting's account 
of the genesis and justification of concern for a friend. Whiting makes the 
crucial pOint, however, that what results is not an existing fri ndship that 
then justifies concern. Inst ad, my care and concern is a component of tile 
friend hip relation; being concerned for my friend is part of what makes me 
her friend. 
According to Whiting, my relation to my future selves can be seen in much 
the same way. My future self and I have many common experiences of 
which we share memories and we share many values and perspectives. And 
in much the way a conc~rn for a friend develops, Whiting says, "general 
concern for my future selves can ... grow out of primitive concerns tllat they 
do Or eXperience certain things" 0986, 564). And again, perhaps most im-
POrtantly, the relationship I bear to my ['Llture selves does not result in or jus-
tify my Concern for them. Instead, my concern for my future selves is part of 
what COnstitutes the psychological continuity in virtue of which they are my 
future elves. If I lacked tllat concern entJrely, tlley would not be my future 
selves. "In this sens "Whiting says, "we make our future selves by coming 
to care about them i~ much the same way tllat we mak friends by COIning 
to care about others" (566). .. 
Whiting thus criticizes the "false SL1pposJtJo~ that concern for our future 
selves must be separable from personal IdentIty and something for which 
sU~h identity provides independe~t and a~tecedent justif~c~tion" 0986, 552). 
NeIther friendship nor psychological cont1l1~l1ty eXI ts dlst1l1ct from tile pat-
terns of car and concern that accompany It, and thus neither can provide 
independent justification for that con~ern:J 6 Instead, the concern comes ~irst, 
along with th tl · psychologIcal lelatJons that charactenze the relation-
e 0 leI . I f" 1 
ship, and what we call the metaphYSlCa acts-:- ~ le's my friend ," "she's my 
future self " or "she's me"-are ways of descnbll1g and reifying those pat-
terns of P~ychological relationship. .. . 
Whiting's view suggests tllat beJ11g a chs:mct person. U1 any normativ ly inl-
portant sense is not a natural or metaphYSIcal ~evltabi!tty, but is (at least in sig-
nificant part) a result of one's choices, con:ulUtJ1lents, and concerns. Like most 
personal identity tlleorists, her focus IS d~ac1?roruc, ~ddres ing what holds a 
person together over time. But the syncllloruc coheSIveness of a person also 
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merits attention: what holds a person together and separates her from those 
around her, making her, at any given time, a distinct individual? I think that the 
view of self-centering I've been developing can shed light on this question. 
Just as I "make" my future self by caring about and identifying with her, so I 
"make" my present self by caring about and paying attention to her projects, 
values, and inner states. I hold myself together as a distinct self, right now, by 
wholeheartedly identifying with myself- by occupying my own perspective 
as its subject. 
Each person is importantly constructed and maintained, then, by her own 
self-regarding attention. Such caring attention is thus not directed to some-
thing entirely fixed, but instead to something uniquely and especially con-
structible by the person herself, precisely through that attention. To fail to di-
rect one's caring attention to oneself, then, is to fail to take responsibility for 
constructing oneself. 17 
This account is echoed in som closely related metaphors and images in 
the views that I've been discussing. Recall that Beauvoir (discussing the 
"woman in love") says that "the center of the world is no longer the place 
where she is. " The actual center of the world never was, of course; Beauvoir 
means that the woman's perspectival center has shifted, that she experiences 
the world as iffrom her beloved's point of view-almost as though she were 
standing in his skin, having abandoned her own. Sin1ilarly, Piper says that vi-
carious possession involves "abdication of oneself to the other as one imag-
ines her"-rather like abdicating the throne, except that here there is no one 
to step into one's place. 
Owen Flanagan has made a sin1ilar point in a different context. Discussing 
the relation of my present self to my future selves, Flanagan says the following: 
The answer to the question .. . - By what right do I legislate now how the life 
of that person I will be then shall gO?-is this: If not me now, dlen who? Even if 
it were possible to abandon the project of shaping the particular f·l.Iture to which 
I will undoubtedly be relatively more connected than anyone else, I would be 
doing far more than ceasing to be presumptuous in a certain way. I would be 
abandoning tbat life to being shaped by forces and parties which are far less 
connected to that life and far less interested in how that life will go. 0 991, 67, 
emphasis added) 
Flanagan's observation suggests that the problematic aspects of "abandon-
ing" oneself are more than self-regarding. In abandoning oneself, one aban-
dons something that is properly in one's charge, thus allowing that thing to 
be shaped and controlled by whatever "forces and parties" may happen 
along: as Beauvoir says, the self-abandoner "lets her own world collapse in 
contingence." The person in the grip of vicarious possession, of course, 
abandons herself to a particular other person-namely, the person(s) by 
whom she is possessed (or in Beauvoir's terms, her "beloved"). The point 
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stands, however: her .' , 
beloved may wodd still collapses In contingence, For what tlle 
come to want v I ' f COntingent matt " ' a ue, or pursue IS, rom her point of view a //If) b~ a1nd yet her persistent attention and responsiveness to the ~ 
s , va ues and p., f I d' , and aims, Thu h ' lOJects !Xes t le Irectlon of her own actions 
is not itself w ith, ehre, too, she abandons control of herself to sometlling tllat 
P h m er control 18 
er aps an apt ' 
guardianship A metaphor for an ideal relationship to oneself is that of 
something or' proper guardian acts on her sense of responsibility for 
, someone m tile first ' t b ".. paymg attentio .' 111S ance, y rema111111g 111 Its presence and 
ing as its gUard~a~ It. To aban.don something is incompatible with function-
but also to his h' The guardian attends not only to her ward's well-being 
Or er cond t d I ' well and that s\h uc an Claracter: she sees to it both tllat s\he fares 
invested carl'n e does not run amok. Such "seeing to it" requires a steady 
, G g and d' , " ' guardian, tilen ' Isclpl111ed attention, To be one's own responsible 
Alt110ugh ' ?ne must center oneself. 
egoists and tl ' 'II who lack an lelr I ( are all around us, so too are those persons 
appro .' , 
one anot11er' tl pilate perspectival home, The two types may reinforce 
, le centerle d th ' exploitation by I ss an e possessed are particularly vulnerable to 
their fear of be~~e ~goi~tic, while the latter'S egoism may be fed in part by 
each, moral d mmg hke tlle former (and thus Similarly vulnerable), For 
stable POSSibil~:elopment requires coming to see that there are safer, more 
orably to the Itlhes-that leaving the familiar one behind does not lead inex-
ot er 
Thus, altilough ' ' , 
absorption d It IS always impoltant to check one's tendencies toward self-
an ego' f girlS-it is equall ' Ism, or many people.-es~ecially many women and 
abandonment y tmpoltant, and at least equally difficult, to guard against self-
not merely a and Vicarious possession, The importance of self-centering is 
structs felnal matter of reSisting sexist exploitation wimin a culture mat con-
G es psy I I ' others, Nor ' If c 10 oglcally as instruments of (mostly male or masculine) 
IS se -cent ' d I' , d meaningful lif ' e r111g merely a means towar lV111g a more engage and 
fully respo 'bel' It IS also essential to constlUcting and maintaining oneself as a 
nSI e p . ' does one's d I' e iSon, Just as one's visual perspective needs a center, so too 
e Iberati 'd If b d tl ter must be "in" Ve perspective; and to avol se -a an onment, lat cen-
omers is tl1 fu oneself. Oneself altllough no more valuable or important tllan 
, e ncti ' " Onal center of a life tllat IS one sown, 
NOTES 
1. See the large and d ' , ' d tl " thi f , " I 
of it originally inspired blveGrsle literature on, f: mtnJsm an C191Se2)e F ~s 0 claleb'l 111UC 1 plmg of work in t1 ' . Y t ltgan's In a Dif./erent VOIce ,01 a va ua e sam-
in Feminist Etl . lIS field, see Held's anthology justice and Care: Essential Readings 
. • ncs (995), 
••. 1\ '" vi '1 
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2. For an enlightening and feminist d iscussion of the phenomenon of "loss of 
self," see Hampton (1993) . 
3. In his critique of what he calls "impartialist morality," Williams asks: "[H)ow can 
an I that has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough identity to 
live a life that respects its own interests? If morality is possil Ie at all , does it leave any-
one in paIticular fo r me to be?" (1985, 69-70) 
4. I owe the idea of "de-centering" to Kukla (1996) . Ca rd (1996), in outlining a 
similar though not identical conception of integri ty, makes a pa rallel observation. 
Speaking of individua ls who have suffe red severe abus ,she points out that 'uch in-
dividuals are particularly vulne rable to inte rnal fragmentation- most dramatically in 
the case of persons with "multiple personalities," less obviously so in other cases. She 
points out that it is difficult fo r a person w ho is seriously inte rnally fragmented to be 
a responsibl agent in the fOlwa rd-looking sense: in the case of the multiple, in par-
ticular, "no one is sufficiently in charge for her to be relial Ie" (45) . 
5. As quoted by I-Iampton (1997, 41) . 
6. As Flye argues, a similar condition can be brought about in a person via tecl1-
niques of coercion and enslavem nt, and/ or by what she ca lls "arrogant perception. " 
(Flye would also no doubt deny that the condition Beauvoir describes is accurately 
called "love.") See he r influential essay "In and Out of Harm's Way: Arrogance and 
Love" in 7Z7e Politics of Reality : Essays in Feminist Tbeoly (983). 
7. Along similar lines, I think that Frankfurt's emphasis on furthering the other's 
interests as a central element of love is misplaced. For an alternative view, see Velle-
man's (1999) account of love, to which I return shortly. 
8. There is a clear continuity here w ith Frankfurt's ea rlier work on second-order 
volitions as central to personhood and free w ill . 
9. Velleman grants that "love is felt for many things other than possessors of rational 
nature"-for infants and other nonreflective, nonrational humans, as well as for books, 
trees, and houses. "But when the object of our love is a person," he claims, "and we 
love him as a person-radler than a a work of nature say o r an aesdletic object- men 
indeed, I want to say, we are responding to d1e value 'mat 'he possesses by vittue of be-
ing a person or, as Kant would say, an instance of rational nature" (1999, 365) . 
10. Velleman recognizes that in loving someone, we often respond powerfully to 
aspects of the person other than her rational nature per se-dle way she throws a 
baseball , for instance, o r he r adorable sneezes. "The immediate object of love," he 
01 serves, "is th manifest person, embodied in flesh and I lood and accessible to dle 
senses . . . . Grasping someone's personhood intellectually may be enough to make 
us respect him, but unless we actually see a person in the human be ing confronting 
us, we won't be moved to love; and we can see d1e person only by seeing him in and 
through his empirica l p rsona. Hence there remains a sense in which we love a per-
son for his observable features . . . . But loving a pe rson fo r the way he walks is not a 
response to the value of his gait; it's rather a response to his gait as an expression or 
symbol o r reminder of his value as a person" (1999, 371). 
11 . Frankfurt makes a similar obselvation (2001 , 5-6) . He points out that defining 
"self-love" in terms of satisfying one's inclinations-as Kant did-seems to confuse 
self-love with self-indulgence. 
12. Piper goes on to argue that "strict impartiality" is in turn required for true com-
passion, so that the vicariously possessed person, li ke the self-absorbed person, can-
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not have true compassion (at least insofar as, or at the time that, he or she is taken up 
In self-absorption/vicarious possession). She means, in so arguing, to refute the com-
mon View that there is a conflict between compassion and impartiality; on the con-
t1 aIY, she says, "an impartial perspective on our own and others' inner states .. . is a 
necessalY condition of ex peri en ing compassion for others" (1991, 726). I w ill not 
pursue this further aspect of Piper's view. 
1 3. In a strict sense, of course, psychologica l connection theolY does not begin 
With Parfi t; it might better be sa id to have begun with Davi I Hume. But my limited 
purpose here is we ll enough selved by considering (a nd brie fl y at that) Parfir and his 
contemporalY fo llowers. 
14. For a deta iled account of such critiques, se Whiting (1986). 
15. Parnt himself hedges on this point, sayi.ng "it seems defensible both to claim 
and to deny that Relation R gives us reason for special concern" (1984 , 312). He does 
POll1t out that at least one reductionist accepts the apparently counterintui tive conse-
quence: Peny grants that on his own view, I have no more or different reason to pre-
Vent my OWn pa in than to prevent someone else' pa in. 
16. This point is lent support by dle fact dlat, as Whiting points out, odler accounts 
of personal identity do not fare well on the antecedent-justification approach either: 
It IS not at all clear, for instance, why or how having the sam inunaterial soul as some 
fUture elf would justify my being concerned for he r. 
17: There is an interesting parallel here, aga in , to Frankfurt's conception of love, 
and 1I1 particular of self- love. Frankfurt raises the question of whether a person wh 
doesn't love anything (else) can be said to love himself. He draws an analogy to dle 
love of parents for dleir children observing dlat parental love is enacted partly by 
helping children develop their ca'pacity for love and by helping them find things to 
love. imilarly for self-love: "The most e lementalY form of self-love .. . consists s-
Sentially in the desire of a person to love. That is, it consi ts in dle p rson's desire to 
have goals that he must accept as his own and to which he is devoted not merely for 
the 1[' instrumental value but for dlemselves . Now this is norhing but a desire on dle 
person's pan that he be in a position to act with firm an I genuine purpose" (2001 , 
10). On my view, this SOlt of desire ultimately amounts to a lesire to bring oneself 
II1to being. 
18. I don't mean here to exaggerate the extent to which one 's own wants, values, 
and aims are within one's own control; obviously, such control is velY limited even 
In the best of cases. Nonetheless, there is a Significant diffe rence between the kind 
of Control one has--or is forced to assume one has, insofar as one adopts a practica l 
deliberative point of view--OV r one's own va lues and aims, and the fa r more indi-
rect and compromised control one can have over another's. 
